

America-China Technology Competition And Its Geopolitical Dimensions

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Abstract

After American (US) President Donald Trump entered office from January 2017 to January 2021, technology emerged as a significant area of strategic competition between the US and China, that is, after the security issues arising from China's dominant engagement in US soft infrastructure became apparent. A prominent topic of debate and discussion among Washington and its European allies, innovations, network infrastructure, and artificial intelligence have become major determinants of the relative economic and military power of countries; This is because there is a consensus that the forces that take the reins of technological leadership in these areas will be the leading global forces in the future. The research aims to shed light on the technological competition between the US. Also China, review the strategy from the two countries in the new technology race, and the extent of its impact on their political and economic relations, analyze the geopolitical motives and dimensions behind this competition and give a possible picture of the repercussions of this competition in the future.

Introduction

Today, the United States and China have entered into increasing technological competition, perhaps on the verge of conflict, but it is not the same as the competition between empires in the nineteenth century for control of land and resources. and technology), which would maximize military power and expand global geostrategic influence later, that is, the ability to create new technologies, especially digital technologies, in light of the increasing importance of key factors in the United States and China such as politics, security and economic growth, relations between the two countries and close trade cooperation, Driven by deep government mistrust, which created inevitable inequalities and tensions.

Economic prosperity gave China confidence and tenacity in international affairs, and it fueled Chinese aspirations to achieve worldwide technical supremacy, especially given the strong relationship between technology and innovation, national security, and international influence. These sectors not only change the global competition environment, but also generate a new political climate and market pressures that the two nations may find difficult to manage in the future. As a result, China has progressively grown its involvement in international forums to create norms and promote its technological standards, which has concerned the United States, which feels that Chinese technology helps its authoritarian regime by allowing blanket social control, and this technology is sold to other authoritarian regimes, thus affecting international technology standards in ways that are harmful Liberal civil and human rights standards.

The research aims to answer the following questions? What is the US-China technological rivalry? And what are its determinants? What are its geopolitical dimensions? What are its future repercussions on the relationship of the two states and on international peace and cohesion? To answer these questions, the research assumes that there is US-Chinese technological competition to reach global technological leadership through a number of determinants such as: innovation and patents, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, Internet infrastructure, access to the moon, and others, all of these areas represent determinants A key factor in technological excellence and achieving global leadership, especially since we live in the age of technology, and therefore we are witnessing today intense efforts and an actual race between the two countries to acquire the elements of technological superiority. And this is what China seeks, which is trying to break the American hegemony and remove the United States from global leadership, and the firm dominance of international organizations and the entirety of the rules of the unipolar international system. China to replace American influence in these areas.

2The first requirement:

2.1 The determinants of US-Chinese technological competition

The major countries are seeking to search for global technological leadership, especially after technology has become today the main driver of political, economic and military power. Therefore, the United States of America and China are competing today to achieve this goal, to achieve global control over the economy, trade and markets with the power of technology, and then expand their global geostrategic influence.

Technological competition is defined as: (an existing threat to revenues targeting technological change in technologies to replace new technologies to replace old ones)[1]. It is also defined as: (any system, device, or program, including any network structure, and , message engineering, trade processing and clearing systems, database architecture, market and trading data storage for statistical analysis purposes, network and market infrastructure, types of data and message processing that support market data processing or order processing or any other software or hardware, is used in the form of the current or any enhanced or modified form of the strategic competition and also technological competition [2]: (It is a competition of ideas between companies or countries for the governance of investment, innovation and the Internet, and the production of advanced technologies to enhance economic and military power and achieve intangible advantages in leadership developed, and reshaping a new environment for international competition [3].

There are a number of main determinants that the United States of America and China are competing to develop and increase investments in in search of global technological leadership that ensures control over modern levers of power, and contributes to expanding their global geostrategic influence. The most prominent of these determinants are the following:

1 - Innovation system

The innovation system in the United States, established in the Eisenhower administration, is based on the use of federal funding to support national laboratories, research universities, and corporations, and to develop technologies for military and commercial use, particularly in semiconductors, mobile phones, and the Internet. Fields during the period from the late fifties to the nineties of the last century, when the end of the Cold War [4]. At the present time, the United States is trying to maintain open and global institutions for research and development and innovation systems that ensured technological competitiveness in the past; this is to deter Chinese efforts that seek to achieve technological leadership in the world. Therefore, Washington is keen today to find new rules, regulations and policies to protect intellectual property (IP) from theft and export of important technologies and data using some of the leading Chinese technology companies [5].

According to U.S. policies, if China becomes dominant in technical innovation, the United States would lose any advantage in shaping bilateral commerce, and so the "Made in China 2025" initiative will pose a fundamental challenge to the interests of the United States. that should impede China, If not stopped completely, so in December 2017, the Trump administration imposed trade sanctions on China, and later, Congress passed the Fiscal Year National Defense Authorization Act, which required the Department of Defense (to formulate an integrated strategy for the government on China) and design a complex set of policies toward China, this approach is part of the technological war launched by the Trump administration against China, to force the latter to abandon or revise its high-tech industrial policy and technology transfer that Beijing is leading politically [6]. In China, the state's interest in acquiring advanced technology goes back to the nineteenth century, but its behavior in this area has become more important in the current century; Because it began to pose a great danger to the United States from the possibility of transferring global technological leadership to China, after China was in the nineties of the last century a center for assembling technology products, it has emerged in the twenty-first century as a force of increasing importance and a major player in high-tech innovation, and this rapid change reflects A clear shift in the priorities of the national state, and in 2006, China announced the National Medium and Long-Term Development Program for Science and Technology, and confirmed that it would become a world leader in science and technology by the middle of the twenty-first century, and had introduced many initiatives in this field, including the emerging strategy, the Industries Initiative, the Internet Plus Plan, and the Made in China 2025 Program, from these initiatives, aims China to achieve leadership in the ICT sector on a global scale [7], and in 2015, a new technical and technological revolution emerged in the Chinese State Council to meet the needs of the new round of science after being reviewed and passed to support the "Made in China 2025" project within the government's 10-year plan to modernize the industrial base in China Through the rapid development of high-tech industries, President Xi Jinping wants China to become one of the most innovative countries in the world by 2020 and a leading global force in science and technology by 2049 [8].

2- Artificial intelligence

Today, the United States and China are engaged in a clear technological challenge in the field of artificial intelligence, but American companies are still superior in this field. A recent survey showed that most of the specialists in the field of artificial intelligence are in the United States, while China ranked seventh, and because artificial intelligence Based on training algorithms using huge databases, Chinese companies have estimated access to 20 percent of the data in the market that excludes US companies, while US companies have greater access to the remaining 80 percent in the markets; This is because Chinese services are less attractive [9]. Today, artificial intelligence is used in the military race and has actually been used to scan mountains of data collected by drones, for image, face, and speech recognition, translation and geolocation, as used in Logistics, such as monitoring, time prediction, etc., and artificial intelligence are also important in making self-driving vehicles determine the best course of action and these features provide great protection against missiles [10]. On this basis, President Trump signed in February 2018, an executive order to launch (the American Artificial Intelligence Initiative), because he believed that continued leadership in artificial intelligence is critical to

maintaining the economy and national security of the United States, that is after China revealed its plans to become a global leader. The world in the field of artificial intelligence by 2030, this new measure was clear by giving China priority as a real competitor to the United States in the leadership of artificial intelligence [11]. As for China, artificial intelligence has become a major driver of economic development, and therefore the United States and Europe face a great challenge. In ensuring competitiveness, potential Chinese security challenges stem from China's major involvement in the soft infrastructure of the United States [12]. China today has a large-scale market for AI applications that can be used to predict human behavior and intervene in crime prevention, so technology is a tool Useful for authoritarian governments such as China that aim to control the movements and interactions of their population, and also contribute to monitoring the movements of terrorists and knowing the plans of They are, and therefore the United States today fears that China will export technology to Asian partners [13].

3.Semiconductors

The competition for the production and sale of advanced techniques such as Semiconductor is increasingly related to US national security, technological competition in itself is not the new thing in the United States, because the latter was in a similar competition with the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, The competition today with China focuses on achieving the economic leadership of the world instead of military power [14]. The United States made several attempts to prevent Chinese companies from investing in the US semiconductor industry, and gradually stressed China's arrival to technology Through commercial channels, therefore, the foreign investment committee in the United States (CFIUS) decided that the semiconductor deal between China is a threat to US national security and cannot be solved through mitigation measures; Because the risk is related to military applications of the Comprehensive Technical Authority, therefore President Barack Obama's buyers and Aixtron to give up the deal, and by 2017, President Donald Trump has prevented Chinese investment attempts in four deals with the recommendation of the foreign investment committee (CFIUS) and to stop Chinese investments in semiconductor Advanced used in military applications, including anti-ballistic missile systems, because they constitute risks to US national security [15]. After President Jubaiden's arrival in power, proposed the establishment of a 2.3\$ trillion infrastructure plan, of which 50\$ billion to support manufacturing and semiconductor research which has become one of the most important technological areas in global competition [16]. In China, semiconductors are essential for all electronic products. China is 60 percent of world demand for semiconductors, so there are serious concerns from the United States on Chinese control over the entire supply chains for all vital sectors, in light of the strong support led by the Chinese government, There are explicit questions about how China achieve its objectives and to what extent to the role played by traditional Western countries in this area [17]. In 2016, the Chinese government has signed an investment of US 22\$ billion as part of the local conductive development management fund 81 per cent of the fund was invested in local shares [18]. China has tried and still trying to achieve local successes in the semiconductor industry. The latest program for semiconductors in China has received government funding of 108\$ billion, accompanied by a national strategy, and this is the third attempt by China to establish a local industry, but these efforts have failed to fail; Due to the lack of skill and corruption, which China has urgently needed to reach Western technology and knowledge. 19, but China is still struggling in vital basic technologies, including conductors and AI Hisilicon, the largest semiconductor company in China, as its revenues reached the US 7.6\$ billion in 2018, about ten revenues achieved by Intel giant chips in the United States [20]. At present, China imports more than 300 billion US dollars from the integrated circuits and adopts Chinese semiconductor developers on patents and design tools made in the United States [21].

4- Internet Networks

All machinery and devices that need to communicate with each other require the implementation of digital probabilities such as telemedicine and automated soldiers to Chinese Huawei-supported with 5G technology; To establish the so-called Internet objects, so Huawei continues to develop more 5G portable devices to facilitate access and excitement to people all over the world and a 5G network is faster than 10 to 100 times from 4G, which allows growing bandwidth In 5g further connected devices that work at the same time and work collectively, also limit the expected decline in delayed communications between devices and servers, allow semi-immediate connection necessary for technologies such as auto-driving, etc., the G5 network is essential to own infrastructure You need European and American companies for growth and innovation and maintain their competitiveness, and has become the main engine of innovation leading industry automation, equipment related to 5G, such as independent vehicles and smart factories, are not available for companies that cannot reach 5G [22]. As well as the use of nanotechnology in the field of communications and the race between countries in this field [23-32].

The Trump administration has resorted to imposing economic sanctions, judicial and diplomatic procedures for the practice of China's ICT strategy and because China is largely dependent on foreign companies in terms of basic technologies and components, the United States has issued a range of targeted domestic legislation and Huawei, Protect national security for the United States, warned the federal agencies from buying telecommunications services, video surveillance or equipment from China's government, including

Huawei, ZTE, HYTERA, HIKVISION and Dahua Technology, and the United States tried to convince or even force its allies and partners to give up For cooperation with China, to restrict foreign markets for Chinese companies [33]. President Jobiden is unlikely to reduce the hardline approach to China in technology; Due to the support of two parties in Congress for a strict business and technological policy towards China, and then the operators who have contracts with Huawei face a difficult option, which contracts with Huawei and compact companies such as Nokia or Ericsson are safer, but at the same time more expensive [34]. In China, the State has some advantages in building a 5G network that is currently published around the world, for example, the state has a competitive capacity in the spectrum and radio-related technologies, although companies such as Nokia and Ericsson provide alternatives, they are lagging behind About Chinese Huawei in terms of research and development (35). And in November 2019, with six other ministries in China, the G6 technological research conference in Beijing, has been established, a national research and development group was established in the field of generation technology The sixth group and a comprehensive expert group, through which China aims to establish comprehensive development ideas for G6 by 2020, and the factory-like China Mobile and Huawei said that the search for G6 technology is already internally in their companies, in ITU, as China is actively involved In influencing future standards for the sixth generation, which has not yet been identified (36).

5. New Moon Racing

Technological competition between major countries has increased dependence on satellites; Due to its use in GPS such as GPS, GALILEO, spyware, and the development of space photo services for defiance and industry, as well as the vital role played in telecommunications, so the excellence in access to satellite is the importance of strategy (37).

The United States is the only country that developed astronaut state science on the moon as part of its national space exploration program and is seeking to restore space pioneers to the moon in 2024, as a new challenge to the Chinese spacecraft Change 4, on the angle on the remote side For the moon, sometimes known as (dark side) has not been visited by the Earth. The US Space Program, also revived the National Space Council, which stopped working for 25 years, and an appointment for his leadership, trying to stimulate NASA's return to the moon and said at a meeting of the National Space Council: (this time, we will do more than just put our knowledge And leave the effects of our feet, but we will establish a long-term presence, and expand our economy and build the basis for the final task to Mars, which will actually occur very quickly) (38). More about this source text source text required for additional translation information Send feedbackSide panels, bill Nelson, director of NASA, has continued to President Biden, this hardline speech, describing China as a severe rival in space and challenging US leadership and has recently warned that watching the Chinese on the moon calls for the United States to intensify efforts In order to face Beijing ambitions in the technological leadership of the world. (39)

China is the newcomer to the moon, the most focused and ambitious, today plans more than ever to follow up a mechanical landing vehicle to explore glaciers, allowing it to provide greater potential to change the strategic game rules [40]. The Chinese Space Agency has shown remarkable progress and is now on its way to becoming a prominent force in space, in 2019, and for the first in China's history, the second state has become after the United States, which lends its spacecraft on the remote and non-spacecraft Populated from the moon, after about six hours of this launch, astronauts have died at Chinese Space Station Tanjong. The spacecraft and concerns about the threat posed by its space plane enhance this letter) as he said on Thursday was an important achievement, but that does not mean that China has been mentioned, not to mention the United States.

1. The second requirement:

1.1 The geopolitical dimensions of the Chinese American competition:

International relations scientists have long recognized the importance of technological technologies in the 21st century. Innovation today plays a major role in the transformations of international strength and international policy and since the 1970s; Robert Gilben said that the main technological developments generated by innovation allow new countries to promote International political superiority [41]. And since President Donald Trump's arrival in power, has worked to intensify the geopolitical competition between the United States and China, when its management is primarily conducted in China's research on alternative techniques for CAL, and its seeking technological relevance and the march of military progress, Washington believes that the Chinese Communist Party deliberately provides Western markets irresistible and short-term economic benefits and shortly targets China in terms of imposing economic hegemony on the world, and the leadership of Western countries is not more reliant on Chinese technology. 33 There are real American concerns about China's ambitions to become a global leader in a wide range of technologies, particularly in industrial policy (making In China 2025) aimed at expanding the high-tech sector in areas such as space, robots, ICTs, this would constitute a threat to the United States technological leadership, exceeding purely trade issues, but affects American international hegemony and its unilateral international system [42].

In the geopolitical perspective, technological innovation, most important within the means of soft and modern warps, perhaps China today is well aware of the importance of innovations and innovation in the

development of Chinese industries and further economic growth, and the extent to determining the scales of world powers, Global serve.

China's policies and practices relating to the transfer of technology, intellectual property and innovation have led to a continuing escalation of tariffs between the two countries, which overwhelmed the US and Chinese economy, but the world, in 2018, the United States imposed customs definitions of nearly 250\$ billion on China's imports, Three rounds, China received increased customs duties on 110\$ billion on imports from the United States in June 2019, and the Trump Customs Department of 10 percent returned to 25 percent over 200\$ billion from imports from China, which was targeted in the previous; China's revenge has raised the tariff rate on 60 billion dollars from imports from the United States, which was previously targeted and in August 2019, the commercial conflict escalated on mutual customs duties, where both sides announced further fees on the KMR, and the Trump administration spoke it is also preparing to increase fees at an additional 300\$ billion worth of goods, which will cover all remaining imports from China, and both countries seek to settle the WTO disputes over these tariffs [43].

China's technological control will inevitably create new alliances to allows China's geopolitical control on global markets and then build its strength and expand its reserve influence, and the seniority of the US and China's decision to realize the importance of innovation technology in building an effective national force, and is strongly aware that it cannot be exaggerated In the importance of technological leadership, to the extent of the two countries to the military clash.

In the area of artificial intelligence, competition between the two countries intensifies the excellence in this area, which would generate serious consequences for international policy, economy, future work and global security, there are real risks that the two countries and high-tech companies supported, To take the initiative with safety, reliability concerns, which may lead to many incidents where artificial intelligence causes when entering the commercial and military sectors, for example, self-attacks are based on artificial intelligence, which would lead to conflicts Dangerous among States[44]. There is an excess of the United States for the talent in the artificial intelligence industry, with more than 28,000 talents in the field of intelligence, compared to 18,000 talents in China during 2017, which indicates that the lead in the technological competition In this area, the United States is still in the hand. Unmanned aircraft, the technological war between the United States and China has weakened the mutual strategic confidence between the two countries, and the Trump has launched a technological war against China, with a view to separating high-tech industries in the United States from those in China, the United States is afraid today China in artificial intelligence is overturned for the last majority of drone driven by artificial intelligence, which China has provided by US enemies, or the hands of terrorist groups, which will take effects of troops and rules throughout the world.

In particular, after the link became close between technology, innovation, national security and international security, and this was confirmed by Russian President Vladimir Putin when he said: (The country that leads artificial intelligence will be the ruler of the world), this may be somewhat exaggerated but not unlikely in time Which has become the ability to innovate is an effective source of national strength and national security, and the force has become different requirements formed by technological changes and cyberspace. 38, and therefore the United States aims to maintain its geopolitical superiority in the field of artificial intelligence, as contribute to controlling and regional extension The American deserve on the world, cut off the road on China's aggravating to achieve this goal. In the semiconductor, the United States maintains first place, and semiconductor is the heart of the American technology industry, and the center of any digital system, while China has soon enjoyed sophisticated manufacture of semiconductors despite the great efforts made in this area, and therefore Until the external supply, especially from the United States and Taiwan, as well as US restrictions on Chinese products are still on China, after the United States felt the importance of semiconductor in the operation and development of Chinese 5G networks.

China has doubled the number of newly registered companies in China in China to more than three times in the first five months of 2021, compared to the same period in 2020, in a new reference that China does not spare any effort to achieve self-sufficiency in semiconductors, China seen from January to May, 15,700 new companies in everything, from design to the manufacture of chips, this increase comes on the background of a wave of investment in the semiconductor industry. Self-Semiconductor, the United States is trying to obstruct China's progress in this area and is concerned with a group of US sanctions [45].On the grounds that China's continued imports on its semiconductor imports on the United States, is a weakness in the power of the Technological State, and has significant impacts on its ambitions to achieve global technological leadership and expand its geopolitical influence, which is allowed to reshape global alliances and change rules The existing international system.

The geopolitical dimension is also clearly shown in the two countries to reach leadership in Internet networks, where the two countries seek to achieve excellence in the world's technological control, and there is consensus.The US decision-makers are to achieve a competitive advantage in the main standards and components of the 5G infrastructure will be allowed to dominate the industry and the application and to engage for governance structures. The United States seeks to achieve excellence in this area despite uncertainty on how

to achieve this goal, but The first step that got the consensus of policymakers in Washington is how to slow down Chinese Huawei, which is believed to offer secret data for the Chinese government, which is seeking to get the 6G network and focused by creating excellence in 6G networks to form Chinese control standards. 5G cellular network infrastructure has become a prerequisite for economic growth, innovation, and modern warfare; Because it allows economies, societies, and armies to take advantage of these new possibilities, the Trump administration views China as the most terrifying competitor and seeks to achieve superiority in this field. The Trump administration has failed with all its efforts to impede the progress of the Chinese company Huawei, and to end China's supremacy in 5G technology; This is because it did not get the consensus of European allies to terminate the contract with 5G networks, did not respond to the decisions of the United States that put Huawei on the blacklist, and called on the European Union to get rid of 5G networks, only two countries are Italy and France, while other countries acted according to their public interests, in When the great shock came from the United Kingdom, the main ally of the United States, and through the words of British Prime Minister Johnson, who announced the United Kingdom's refusal to get rid of the 5G networks, and that he would allow Huawei, to provide equipment for the 5G mobile network in Britain; Because ending its services directly would pose a high risk to sellers, and similarly Germany seems ready to allow Huawei to contribute to the 5G network, according to the words of German Chancellor Merkel, in January 2020, who expressed her desire to avoid a complete ban on Huawei and her tendency to adopt a security position. Instead, Washington's campaign to isolate and punish Huawei appears to have failed, as have attempts to build an anti-China alliance[46].

The tendency of the United States and the European Union countries to rely on Nokia and Ericsson companies instead of Huawei will cost them a lot. China has confused American and European strategic thinking; Because ending dependence on Huawei, and 5G networks means great losses in money and employment for companies as well as in research, development and manufacturing, and continuing with 5G networks means more superiority for China as long as there is a direct link between Huawei and the Chinese government, so the United States and its allies resorted to using a compromise which is Keeping pace with Huawei, and trying to phase out 5G networks gradually over a certain period of time. Today, the Biden administration expects from Europe, which supports US policy toward China, on technological issues such as 5G networks, at least in trade rules, or alliance systems in the Indo-Pacific region, that it will be easier for Europeans than they were under Donald Trump who seemed to see the European Union not as a partner but as an adversary, and he described it at one time as “worse than China.”[46]. China's superiority over the United States in the field of telecommunications, specifically in the 5G networks, and its relentless pursuit to produce 6G networks, is a clear indication of China's aspirations and future endeavours.

Side panels in geopolitical control of the means of communication that guarantees it access to important data and information, and the extent of this danger in The espionage and sabotage operations that it may use against its opponents, to achieve its undeclared goals of economic domination over the world, which allows it to weaken the geopolitical influence of its opponents in important and vital geographic areas, and reshape the political map of the world. A unified position to prevent China from achieving its goals in this field if it wants to maintain global hegemony. In the field of the new moon race, China remains the main opponent of the United States, which enjoys more clarity, as a rising global power, and is strongly motivated by the kind of national pride that led the United States two generations ago, and this was confirmed by Yi Bijian, head of the moon program in his speech, in which he said: (If we don't go there now despite our ability to do so, our grandchildren will be blamed) and under this rhetoric, the Chinese government has a more pragmatic rationale behind which lays aspirational geopolitical dimensions of global domination and domination. Central to not only putting China's flag on the moon, but to lead the way in the space industry, some experts see this new space race as the number one real danger to American leadership, and like a focused competitor with resources that outweigh most of its competitors, China has real potential to win. It even surpasses the supremacy that America takes for granted [47]. Finally, it can be said that the follower of China's policy will find that the latter is trying to drag the United States into multiple labyrinths under different names [48]. The goal of this policy is to confuse American strategic thinking and trap the United States as a world hegemon, and to assume the reins of global hegemony by relying on soft war methods without Direct confrontation with the United States, as China is trying to destabilize American strategic planning by opening vast fronts to the United States for the purpose of gradually exhausting the latter, breaking its prestige, weakening its global influence, and raising astonishment among the world public opinion for the unique achievements China offers that the United States today is unable to provide achievements for its people and for the year [49-52].

3. Conclusions:

1. The United States is trying to maintain the open and universal R&D institutions and innovation systems that have ensured technological competitiveness in the past; In order to deter the Chinese efforts that seek to reach the technological leadership of the world, and this would affect security and peace, entering the world into major conflicts.

2. According to American policy, if China becomes dominant in technical innovation, the United States will lose any edge in shaping bilateral commerce, and so the "Made in China 2025" initiative would pose a fundamental danger to the interests and national security of the United States.

3. China's high-tech behavior has become more important in the twenty-first century; because it is starting to pose a great danger to the United States from the possibility of transferring global technological leadership to China.

4. The United States to the present time is still superior to China in major technological areas such as innovation, artificial intelligence, and the semiconductor industry, and this in the geopolitical perspective constitutes a major strength factor for the United States, while it is considered a weakness in building China's technological strength and geostrategic influence.

5. China is superior to the United States and its European allies in the field of telecommunications, specifically from the 5G networks, which are backed by the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, and this geopolitically could pose a great danger in the future to the United States and its allies in competitiveness with China in the market; Because it may enable China to penetrate cyber security, spy on competitors, and obtain confidential and important data that support its attainment of technological leadership, and then world leadership.

6. China's continued dependence on the United States in its imports of semiconductors is considered a weak factor in the country's technological strength, and it has significant effects on its ambitions to achieve leadership.

7. China's attainment of global technological leadership will inevitably lead to the re-formation of new global alliances, allowing China to change the rules of the existing international system, and enabling it to control the geostrategic world markets, and then control the world.

8. The observer of China's policy finds that the latter is trying to drag the United States into multiple labyrinths under different names. The goal of this policy is to confuse American strategic thinking and trap the United States as a world hegemon, and to take over global hegemony by relying on soft war methods without military confrontation direct contact with the United States.

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